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Abstract. We introduce novel techniques for organizing the indexing structures
of how data is stored so that alterations from an original version can be detected
and the changed values speciﬁcally identiﬁed. We give forensic constructions for
several fundamental data structures, including arrays, linked lists, binary search
trees, skip lists, and hash tables. Some of our constructions are based on a new
reduced-randomness construction for nonadaptive combinatorial group testing.
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1 Introduction
Computerforensics [71] deals with methods for extractingdigital evidence after a com-
puter crime has been committed. Typically, such crimes involve modifying documents,
databases, and other data structures to an attacker’s advantage. Examples could include
a student changing a grade in a registrar’s database, a dishonest speculator altering on-
line ﬁnancial data for a certain company, an identity thief modifying personal informa-
tion of a victim, or a computer intruder altering system logs to mask a virus infection.
It would be ideal in such cases if an investigator could identify, after the fact, which
pieces of information were changed and, in so doing, be able to implicate the attacker.
In the rest of this section, we describe our motivation, model, and related work, and
we summarize our contributions. But before doing so, we brieﬂy give a simpliﬁed and
intuitive overview of what this paper is about.
A cryptographic one-way hash is a commonly used way of detecting unauthorized
or otherwise malicious modiﬁcation of a ﬁle or other digital object (e.g., [5,44,62],
to mention a few of many examples). This is done by storing a keyed cryptographic
hash of the item and using it later as a reference for comparison. This paper is about
going beyondthe yes/no affordedby this commonuse of cryptographichashes: given n
items, we now seek to store as few hashes as possible so as to enable the pinpointing of
which of these n items were modiﬁed (by comparing the computed hashes to the stored
hash values). Of course a hash is now applied to (a concatenation of) a subset of the
n items. But which subsets, and how many of them, are needed so as to pinpoint the
modiﬁcations of up to d of the n items ? We show that remarkably few hashes sufﬁce.
Why it is so important to use few hashes will become apparent when we consider the
application we describe for the above-mentioned combinatorial result: the case when
the n items are in the nodes of a data structure, and we seek to store the hashes withinthe topology of the data structure, i.e., without using any additional space (and, of
course, without modifying any of the n items stored in the data structure). In other
words, this forensic marking comes “for free” as far as the space of the data structure is
concerned.
Motivation. As mentionedabove,inthis paperweinitiate aninvestigationintomethods
for encoding information in the way data is indexed so as to identify if it has been
altered, and if so, to determine exactly the pieces of information that have changed.
Formally,we model this problem in terms of a data structure D that is stored on a semi-
trusted machine, which under normal circumstances, would use D for some desired
purpose. If there is an indication or suspicion that D has been altered in a malicious
way, thenwe would like to enablea computerinvestigator,whom we call the auditor,to
examine the current state of D to determine what, if anything, has changed. Of course,
a trivial solutionwouldbe for the auditorto cache a copyof D in protectedmemoryand
do a simple comparison of this copy of D to the current version. This solution would
achieve the desired goal of identifying exactly the parts of D that have changed, but it
would also require a tremendous amount of storage for the auditor, who is potentially
responsibleforalargecommunityofusersandcomputers.Thus,weadditionallyrestrict
solutions to use no storage at the auditor (or equivalently in protected memories), other
than possibly some small number of administrative values, such as a master key for
“unlocking” information encoded in D. We refer to this problem as that of indexing
information for data forensics, or data forensics marking, for short.
Model. We are further interested only in solutions where marking the indexing struc-
ture of data leaves the actual data values unchanged, since changing data values could
alter the outcome of queries in unintended ways. Unlike well-known digital water-
marking techniques [18], we want to encode authentication information only in the
organizational structure of a data structure D, not in the values stored in it. We allow
ourselves the possibility of modifying non-data ﬁelds in D, but we require that any
such changes we carry out be stealthy, that is, not immediately detectable by the ad-
versary. In information-hiding terminology, we view the information hidden in D to
be steganographic rather than a watermark (which, strictly speaking, does not require
stealthiness, whereas steganographyrequires that even the presence of hidden informa-
tion be undetectable). Ideally, we want to encode information only in the topology of
D’s pointersandthe orderingof D’s memoryblocks,yet we desirethere to be sufﬁcient
information so as to speciﬁcally identify any portions of D that have been changed by
an attacker. Note that this requirement for pinpointing of the changes goes beyond the
notionof makingthe structuretamper-evidentin the usual yes/no sense, somethingusu-
ally achieved using HMACs and digital signatures, but whose yes/no outcome has too
coarse a granularity for our purposes.
Our model of the adversary is as follows. The adversary has access to the data
structure D after it has been deployed on the semi-trusted machine and can modify
the values of D, but not the topology of D’s pointers and the ordering of D’s memory
blocks. This assumption is realistic in many practical applications for the following
two reasons. First, regular users typically provide data to an application through the
application’s user interface but cannot modify the application’s internal storage or theapplication’s code to alter the memoryarrangementof the data. Second, even if the user
were able to alter the data organization, the user may not think about doing it because
of the stealthiness of the marking.
TheadversaryissuccessfulifhecanmodifysomevaluesofD withoutsuchchanges
beingdetected by the auditor.The adversaryhas knowledgeof the algorithmthe auditor
will use to performa forensic analysis of D. However, we do not allow the adversaryto
know the cryptographic master key maintained by the auditor, nor of any keys that are
derived from such a master key. This is the usual (and preferred) “white box” security
requirement. Although in practice one may gain additional “security through obscu-
rity”, it is wiser to assume the adversaryknows all but the keys. We illustrate this model
in Figure 1.
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Fig.1. An illustration of data forensics marking.
Prior Related Work. Computer forensics has been applied to software authorship de-
tection [43,63], the integrity of audit logs using external protected memories [59],
tracing IP packets during denial-of-service attacks [29,57], and e-mail author identi-
ﬁcation [20]. We are not familiar with any previous work on data forensics marking,
however. Nevertheless, there has been considerable prior work in the theoretical com-
puter science literature on a number of related areas, including digital watermarking,
combinatorialgrouptesting, programchecking,propertytesting, andauthenticateddata
structures. We review some of this prior work here.
Digital watermarking [18] deals with methods for hiding a mark (usually identify-
ing information) in digital content in a manner that is resilient, i.e., hard to remove byan adversarywithout considerablydamagingthe object. There are many applications of
watermarking, including inserting ownership information,inserting purchaser informa-
tion,placingcaptioninformation,etc.Most watermarkingworkhas beenonmultimedia
content, where minor degradation of the quality of the media is acceptable in order to
make the mark more resilient. There have been some notable exceptions, dealing with
watermarking software, semi-structures (XML), and relational databases. Collberg and
Thomborson [19,17], Chang and Atallah [15], Horne, Matheson, Sheehan, and Tar-
jan [38] and Venkatesan, Vazirani, and Sinha [70], present schemes for watermarking
software. Qu and Potkonjak [55] propose a watermarking scheme for graph colorings.
Khanna and Zane [39] describe a scheme for encoding information in the weights of a
graph representing a map so as to preserve shortest paths. Gross-Amblard [35] studies
ways of changing values to encode identifying information in a database or XML doc-
ument so as to preserve the answers to certain queries. Marking XML structures is also
the topic of Sion et al. [60]. Database watermarking that slightly degrades the data was
proposedbyAgarwalet al. [1]and Sionet al. [61].This watermarkingworkis relatedto
data forensics markingin that it is directed at encodinginformationin digital content. It
differs from data forensics marking, however, in that digital watermarking allows data
values to change (in hopefully imperceptible ways) and is not interested in identifying
the speciﬁc places where content has changed.
Several researchers have studied combinatorial group testing and its applications to
cryptographyand information encoding (e.g., see [16,26]). This area is directed at per-
forming group tests on subsets of a given set S to identify defective elements in S. The
area has not to date been applied to data index integrity, but in this paper we show an
interesting connection between data forensics marking and a new reduced-randomness
construction of a nonadaptive combinatorial group testing scheme, which may be of
independent interest. As evidence for this claim, we observe that Kurosawa, Johans-
son, and Stinson [45] explore other applications of reduced-randomness constructions
in cryptography, and Stinson, van Trung, and Wei [65] explore applications of group
testing to key distribution in cryptography.
Following early work on programchecking (see, e.g., [7,66,67]), efﬁcient schemes
have been developed for checking the results of various data structures and algorithms
(see, e.g., [4,8–10,23,24,27,40,48,49]). These schemes typically utilize linear space
withcheckingalgorithmsthatrunfasterthantheconstructionalgorithmstheyarecheck-
ing, and they are directed at detecting if an algorithm has performed correctly or not.
We are not aware, however, of any prior work on program checking that, in addition to
detecting an error state, also identiﬁes all the places in a program or structure that have
become invalid. Likewise, the related area of property testing is directed at determining
if a combinatorial structure satisﬁes a certain property or is “far” from such a structure
(e.g., see [56]), and it too does not identify all property violations.
Prior work in the area of authenticated data structures [3,11,13,14,21,22,28,30–
34,41,42,47,52,54,68,69] has focused on disseminating information from a single,
trustedsourceso that analterationto thedata structurecouldbe detected,but notspecif-
ically identiﬁed. That is, they do not provide solutions to the data forensics marking
problem. Related work on committed databases has recently been presented in [53].Our Contributions. In this paper, we introduce the data forensics marking framework
and give several results for this model that use no additional storage at the auditor other
than a master key. The security of our methods are based on standard cryptographicas-
sumptions.Namely,weassumetheexistenceofthemessageauthenticationcode(MAC)
cryptographic primitive, which is a key-dependent one-way collision-resistant function
(see, e.g., [50,58,64]). A message authentication code can be constructed from a stan-
dard cryptographic hash function.
We give forensic constructions for several fundamental data structures, including
arrays, linked lists, binary search trees, skip lists, and hash tables. Some of our con-
structions are based on a new reduced-randomness construction for nonadaptive com-
binatorial group testing, which is of independent interest.
All of our data forensics marking constructions involve two phases of computation.
In the ﬁrst phase, we build a program P and authentication information A for S so
that P can detect and identify up to some number, d, of changes to S in the indexing
structure D using A. In the second phase, we encode P and A in the organizationaland
topological structure of D in a way that is probabilistically difﬁcult for the adversary
to reproduce, yet it also preserves the accuracy of P with high probability or it still
allows P to restrict the changed values in S to a small set of candidates (which is often
sufﬁcient for forensics). The challenge, of course, is to design the encoding of P and A
in D so that it can survive up to d alterations of the values in S, as stored in D, that the
adversary might make.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
– We develop a new reduced-randomness construction for nonadaptive combinato-
rial group testing. In particular, we show how to construct a t×n d-disjunct binary
matrix M encoding a nonadaptive combinatorial group test for n items that can
detect up to d defective items, with t being O(d2 logn). Our construction uses
only O(d3 lognlogd) random bits and is correct with high probability, whereas
previous schemes use Θ(d2nlogn) random bits and are not high-probability con-
structions.Thus,we can encodematrixM usingO(logn) bits whend is a constant,
a polylogarithmicnumber of bits when d is polylogarithmic,or o(n) bits when d is
o(n1/3/log
2/3 n), which is of independent interest.
– We give efﬁcient forensic constructions of several fundamental data structures, in-
cluding binary search trees, skip lists, arrays, linked lists, and hash tables. The
number of changes we can detect and identify for a data structure D storing a
set S of n elements is O(n1/3/log
2/3 n) for balanced search trees and skip lists,
O(n1/4/log
1/4 n) for arrays and linked lists, and O(1) for hash tables.
Inthe nextsection, we describeourreduced-randomnessconstructionof a nonadap-
tive combinatorial group test. In Section 3, we outline our two-phase constructions of
indexing structures for data forensics marking schemes. We conclude in Section 4.
2 Blood Testing and Forensics
As mentioned above, some of our solutions utilize a reduced-randomness construction
of a nonadaptivecombinatorialgroup testing scheme. Combinatorial group testing [26](or “CGT”) schemes identify “bad” members of a set S of n elements using group
tests. A group test consists of selecting a test sample T ⊂ S and performing a single
experiment to determine whether or not T contains a bad element. A testing scheme
that makes all its tests in a single round, with all test sets determined in advance, is
said to be nonadaptive.Most efﬁcient schemes are designed assuming there is an upper
bound, d, on the number of possible bad members of the input set S, where 1 ≤ d < n.
Combinatorialgrouptestingwas originallyformulatedfortesting bloodsupplies during
World War II, with a group test comprising a tester extracting a few drops from each
blood sample in a test set, pooling them together, and testing the mixed sample for the
syphilis antigen [25].
Reduced-Randomness Nonadaptive Combinatorial Group Testing. For the case d =
1, it is straightforward to design a nonadaptive scheme using O(logn) tests. For the
general case, d > 1, however, designing efﬁcient general testing schemes is more chal-
lenging. Adaptive schemes generally make fewer total tests, in terms of d and n, than
nonadaptive schemes. In particular, the best known general-purpose adaptive schemes
use O(dlog(n/d)) tests, whereas the number of tests used by the best known general-
purpose nonadaptive schemes is O(d2 logn) [26]. Even so, adaptive schemes are not
applicable in many contexts, including DNA sequence analysis and the context of this
paper.
Our application of combinatorial group testing to data forensics marking is based
on the use of nonadaptive CGT schemes. Unfortunately, the known deterministic non-
adaptive CGT schemes are asymptotically suboptimal or not designed for most values
of d and n, and the known randomized CGT schemes, for d ≥ 2, utilize Θ(d2nlogn)
random bits (e.g., see [26]). These drawbacks make existing nonadaptivecombinatorial
group testing schemes infeasible for data forensics marking, where we wish to limit the
memory requirements of the auditor.
In this section, we present a simple, randomized nonadaptive combinatorial group
testingscheme,ford ≥ 2,wherewereducetheneededrandombitstobeO(d3 lognlogd).
This reduced-randomnessCGT scheme is based onapplyingthe constructionof Alonet
al. [2] of almost k-wise independent random variables (see also [6,51]) to the random-
ized CGT approach of Busschbach [12], and then showing that almost k-wise indepen-
dent random variables can be used to achieve an efﬁcient nonadaptive CGT with high
probability (which is, in fact, a stronger result than the previous algorithm achieves us-
ing fully independent variables). The main idea of this approach is to construct a t × n
binary matrix M, where each column corresponds to an element of S and each row
corresponds to a test—so that M[i,j] = 1 if and only if element j is included in test i.
A t × n binary matrix M is d-disjunct [26] if, for any d + 1 columns with one of
them designated, there always exists a row with a 1 in the designated column and 0’s in
the other d columns. Given a d-disjunct binary matrix M, we can immediately design a
nonadaptivecombinatorialgroup testing scheme—simply perform the test indicated by
each row of M. With the results of these tests in hand,we can then removeeach column
of M that has a 1 in a row that returned a negative test result (recall that, in the testing
framework, a negative is a good outcome). The remaining columns correspond to the
“bad” elements. The correctness of this algorithm is derived directly from M being
d-disjunct, for if we designate a “good” column together with a group of up to d badcolumns, there must be a row (i.e., a test) that includes the good column and excludes
the bad ones. See Figure 2.
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Fig.2. An illustration of a t × n d-disjunct matrix.
Our algorithm for building a d-disjunct t × n matrix M is simply to set each
M[i,j] = 1 with probability roughly 1
d+1, by using “almost” k-wise independent ran-
dom variables. The notion of being almost k-wise independent that we use is based on
the following deﬁnition of Alon et al. [2]:
Deﬁnition 1. Asetofprobability-(1/2)randombits,x1,x2,...,xn,is(￿,k)-independent
if, for any k-bit vector α and k positions i1 < i2 < ··· < ik, we have
|Pr[xi1xi2 ···xik = α] − 2
−k| ≤ ￿.
Alon et al. [2] establish the following important fact:
Lemma 1. Let N = 2r − 1 and let k be an odd integer. Then, using
2
￿￿
log
1
￿
+ log
￿
1 +
(k − 1)r
2
￿￿￿
probability-(1/2) random bits, one can construct a set of N probability-(1/2) bits that
are(￿,k)-independent.Thatis,thenumberofneededrandombitsisroughly2log
￿
k log N
2￿
￿
.
Given Lemma 1, we would like to set t so that the t × n random matrix M we
construct will be d-disjunct with high probability.
Theorem 1. Given integers d and n such that 2 ≤ d < n, one can construct a t ×
n binary matrix M that is d-disjunct with high probability, using O(d3 lognlogd)
random bits, where t is Θ(d2 logn).
Proof. Let R be a set of tnl probability-(1/2) random bits that are (￿,(d + 1)tl)-
independent,where l = dlog(d+1)e and t and ￿ will be set in the analysis. Considering
these bits l at a time, we can convert this set into a set R0 of probability-p bits, where
p = 1/2l, so that 1/2(d+1) < p ≤ 1/(d+1).We use the bits in R0 to deﬁne the matrix
M so that M[i,j] = 1 if and only if the corresponding bit in R0 is equal to 1. (Note:Azar, Motwani, and Naor [6] have an alternate, more general, approach for construct-
ing almost k-independentprobability-p bits, but their construction is more complicated
than what is needed here.)
Considernow a particularcolumnj and d othercolumnsj1,j2,...,jd in matrix M.
For any row i in M, had the random variables in R0 been at least (d+1)-wise indepen-
dent, then the probability that M[i,j] = 1 and M[i,js] = 0, for s = 1,2,...,d, would
be p(1 − p)d. Thus, had the variables in R0 been at least (d + 1)t-wise independent,
then the probability that no such row exists (a failure) among these columns would be
￿
1 − p(1 − p)d￿t
.
Notice that this probability is actually determined by (d + 1)tl bits in R. Let F denote
the set of all vectors of values for these k = (d + 1)tl bits xi1xi2 ...xik that result in
a failure event for column j and the d other columns, and note that |F| ≤ 2k. Then, by
Lemma 1, for each vector α in F, we have
|Pr[xi1xi2 ···xik = α] − 2−k| ≤ ￿.
That is, we obtain
2−k − ￿ ≤ Pr[xi1xi2 ···xik = α] ≤ 2−k + ￿.
In other words, this probabilityis boundedfromabove by ￿ plus the value it would have
been had these bits been k-wise independent. Therefore, we have
X
α∈F
Pr[xi1xi2 ···xik = α] ≤
￿
1 − p(1 − p)d￿t
+ 2k￿.
There are (d + 1)
￿ n
d+1
￿
ways of distinguishing a column j and d other columns in M.
Moreover,the probabilitythat anycolumnj and d othersdeterminea failureis certainly
nomorethantheprobabilitythat all suchgroupsdeterminea failure,which,irrespective
of any considerations about the independenceof the underlyingrandom variables, is no
more than
(d + 1)
￿
n
d + 1
￿
￿
1 − p(1 − p)
d￿t
+ (d + 1)
￿
n
d + 1
￿
2
k￿.
By the deﬁnition of p, this probability is at most
(d + 1)
￿
n
d + 1
￿"
1 −
1
2(d + 1)
￿
1 −
1
d + 1
￿d#t
+ (d + 1)
￿
n
d + 1
￿
2k￿.
Using the inequalities (1 − 1/(d + 1))d > 1/3 and (d + 1)
￿ n
d+1
￿
≤ nd+1, for d ≥ 2,
and substituting in the value for k, we can further simplify this probability as being at
most
nd+1
￿
1 −
1
6(d + 1)
￿t
+ nd+12(d+1)tl￿.For our claim to hold with high probability,we would like each of the aboveterms to be
at most 1/n. To boundthe ﬁrst term by 1/n, we can use the inequality −ln(1−x) ≥ x,
for 0 ≤ x < 1, and we can set
t = 6(d + 1)(d + 2)dlnne,
which is Θ(d2 logn). Given this value for t, to then bound the second term by 1/n, we
can set
￿ = n−(d+2)2−6(d+1)
2(d+2)dlnnedlog de.
According to Lemma 1, the number of random bits needed for this construction is
2
￿￿
log
1
￿
+ log
￿
1 +
(k − 1)logN
2
￿￿￿
.
That is, the number of random bits needed is O(d3 lognlogd).
Having a reduced-randomness construction, as speciﬁed in Theorem 1, allows us
to encode a t × n d-disjunct binary matrix M simply by storing the O(d3 lognlogd)
random bits used to generate M.
3 Speciﬁc Constructions for Data Forensics Marking
We use Theorem 1 in many of our data forensics marking solutions, which we brieﬂy
outline in this section. Throughout this discussion, we assume the reader is familiar
with the fundamentaldata structures mentioned.In addition, throughoutthis section we
assume that the auditor and data structure designer share a secret key K that is easily
derived from the auditor’s master key and the data structure designer’s identity. We also
assume the existence of a message authentication code (MAC) function fK(x) with
key K. (see, e.g., [50,58,64]).
From Test Samples to Set Integrity Checking. Given a nonadaptive combinatorial
group test (CGT) for detecting up to d defectives in a set of n items, we can convert
this into a test of the integrity of a collection S of n items stored in a data structure. For
each test T speciﬁed by the CGT, compute its authentication value aT deﬁned by
aT = fK(x1 ||x2 || ··· ||xm),
where fK is a MAC function and x1,···xm are the items of S included in test T, in
sorted order. We can then recompute aT on an altered copy of S to determine if this
value has changed. If so, then we know that an item in T has been modiﬁed. Thus, per-
formingall these comparisonsforall the tests in the CGT wouldgiveus a determination
of which items in S have changed.
Lemma 2. We can construct a forensic scheme for a set of n elements so as to detect
and identify which of up to d of its elements have been changed, with high probability,
using O(d3 log
2 n) bits of authentication information.The problem, of course, is that the auditor does not have enough memory to store
an encoding of a CGT. Nevertheless, Theorem 1 gives a way of avoiding storing any-
thing at the auditor, for it implies that we can encode a nonadaptive CGT for detecting
d defective elements among n using only O(d3 lognlogd) bits. The number of tests
determined by these bits is O(d2 logn). For each test T deﬁned by this CGT, we need
to store the authentication value aT, Note that aT is determined by a message authen-
tication code based on the key K, which is unknown to the adversary. Thus, the CGT
and its associated authenticationvalues can be representedusing O(d3 log
2 n) bits. Our
solution, then, to avoid any storage at the auditor, is to encode these bits in the data
structure itself.
Balanced Binary Search Trees. A balanced binary search tree holding n items has
O(logn) depth. Its structure can also easily encode O(n) bits in a simple recursive
fashion. Given a set S of comparable items, we have n/2 items that we can pick for
the root’s value (from the middle half of elements from rank n/4 to 3n/4). The exact
choice allows us to encode log(n/2) bits at the root level, and we can then repeat this
construction recursively at each child. Since we can encode in the tree a total of O(n)
bits we picking d that is o(n1/3/log
2/3 n).
By Lemma 2, we obtain the following result:
Theorem 2. We can construct a forensic scheme for a balanced binary tree storing n
elements so as to detect and identify which of up to O(n1/3/log
2/3 n) of its values have
been changed, with high probability.
Skip Lists. We can use, for skip lists, a scheme similar to the one developed for binary
search trees. At each level of the skip list structure, about half of the (say) m elements
of that level will survive to the next (higher) level. This allows us to encode at that level
a number of bits equal to
log
￿
m
m/2
￿
≥ log(2
m/2) = m/2,
Hence, the overall encoding capacity in an n-element skip list is O(n) bits. Thus, just
as for the balanced binary tree case, by Lemma 2, we obtain the following result:
Theorem 3. We can construct a forensic scheme for a skip list storing n elements so as
to detect and identify which of up to O(n1/3/log
2/3 n) of its values have been changed,
with high probability.
Arrays and Linked Lists. Arrays and linked lists allow up to O(nlogn) bits to be
encodedin thepermutationofthe items storedinthe list orarray.But this informationis
stored implicitly, since the ordering itself could be altered should the adversary change
values. Our solution in this case is to replicate the CGT and its expected values d +
1 times and spread these multiple encodings evenly across the bits encoded by the
permutation. By a pigeon-hole argument, even if the adversary changes d values, there
will still be a large enough contiguous run of unchanged values that encode the CGT
andits expectedvalues so as to allow us to determinewhich valuesmighthave changed.In this case we need O(d4 log
2 n) bits. Therefore, by Lemma 2, we have the following
result:
Theorem 4. We can construct a forensic scheme for an array or linked list storing n
elements so as to detect and identify which of up to O(n1/4/log
1/4 n) of its values have
been changed, with high probability.
Thisconstructioncanalsobeappliedtorelationaldatabasesthatuseadata-independent
index number or unique ID to name records. In this case we can treat the index number
in the same way we used positions in an array or linked list.
Hash Tables. A hash table for a set S of n elements consists of a bucket array B
of size O(n) and a hash function h which maps elements of S to cells of B under
some collision-handlingrule. Let us assume that h is based on a simple, standard linear
function, so that h(x) = αx + β mod p, for each x in S, where p is a prime on the
order of n. There is not a lot of variability in such a hash table that we can exploit for
forensic analysis, but there is nevertheless enough for the following:
Theorem 5. A hash table has a forensic construction that can detect and identify a
single value insertion or deletion and can isolate a changed value to a set of constant
expected size.
Proof. Our construction begins by choosing p to be a random prime on the order of n
(for hash table efﬁciency, it is good that p is slightly largerthan n) such that p mod 4 =
n mod 4. Sort the elements of S and compute value α deﬁned as follows:
α = fK(x1 ||x2 || ··· ||xn ||p),
wherex1,···xn are the items ofS in sortedorder.We thencomputevalueβ as follows:
β = x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ ··· ⊕ f0(p).
We then deﬁne the hash function h for the hash table as h(x) = αx + β mod p.
Let us consider the forensic capabilities of this structure. If an item is deleted, then
we can detect this case using α and we can recompute the deleted value from the XOR
of β and the remaining values in the hash table. If a value is added, then we can detect
this case using α and we can compute the complement of this value from the XOR of β
and the existing values in the hash table. If a value is changed, then we can detect this
case using α and β. For each element x in the hash table, we can use β to determine
what its value should have been were x the item that changed, and then recompute α
to verify that this is the case. The expected number of values that will be determined to
have possibly changed will be O(1) and the adversary cannot control this value, since
he does not know K and is assumed to be unable to invert f.
Security. The security of our constructions is based on the fact that a successful ad-
versary will have to invert or ﬁnd collisions in the message authentication function fK
used or recover the secret key K shared by the data structure designer and auditor. A
complete security proof will be given in the full version of the paper.Extension. We can extend our results to a stronger adversarial model, where the ad-
versary can also modify a constant fraction of the authentication information hidden
in the data structure. For this purpose, we encode the authentication information us-
ing the cryptographicvariation of the Guruswami-Sudanlist decoder [36,37] presented
in [46]. Even with this stronger model, we obtain results analogous to those given in
Theorems 2–4. Details will be given in the full version of the paper.
4 Conclusion
We have introduced the topic of informationindexing for data forensics marking, given
a new reduced-randomness construction for nonadaptive combinatorial group testing,
and applied this and other techniques to design efﬁcient and robust constructions of
forensic schemes for several kinds of data indexing structures. We believe there is still
a considerable amount of additional work that could be done in this area. In particular,
it would be useful to have efﬁcient forensic schemes for data that is changingover time.
Such a solution would solve the problemof maintainingforensic data for audit logs and
dynamic databases.
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